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CHEAP TALK RECONSIDERED: NEW
EVIDENCE FROM CVM
David Aadland and Arthur J. Caplan

ABSTRACT

Two recent studies have shown that "cheap talk" is an effective means of eliminating
positive hypothetical bias in experimental and field-auction settings. We further investigate the
ability of cheap talk to mitigate positive hypothetical bias in a CVM phone survey administered
to over 4,000 households. Positive hypothetical bias is first detected in our data by contrasting
revealed and stated preference information. However, a short, neutral cheap-talk script appears
to exacerbate rather than mitigate the bias. Based on this and mixed evidence from earlier
studies, we suggest caution in using cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical bias.
JEL classification: Q26, C35

Key words: cheap talk, contingent valuation, hypothetical bias

CHEAP TALK RECONSIDERED: NEW
EVIDENCE FROM CVM*

1. Introduction

The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a widely used approach for estimating the value
of goods and services when market information on equilibrium prices and quantities is either
unavailable or unreliable. CVM has been employed by courts and government agencies such as
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to assess the benefits of policies
impacting the environment and damages from environmental disasters. Researchers often
estimate these values through surveys that ask individuals to place a monetary value on the
hypothetical provision of a good or service. Since provision of the good and the associated
payment are purely hypothetical, the reliability and validity of information obtained from CVM
has been the subject of lively debate (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Hanneman, 1994).
Proponents of CVM have attempted to develop new methodologies that either (1) mitigate ex
ante any hypothetical bias (i.e., bias associated with the respondent misstating her willingness to

pay (WTP) due to the hypothetical nature of the good and payment method), or (2) calibrate the
welfare estimates ex post (List and Shogren, 1998).
Recently, Cummings and Taylor (1999) and List (2001) have advocated the use of "cheap
talk" to mitigate the effects of hypothetical bias in CVM. In the context of CVM, cheap talk
refers to explicit warnings about the problem of hypothetical bias provided prior to respondents'
valuation of the good. Cummings and Taylor (CT hereafter), in a series of lab experiments with
students, find that cheap talk successfully eliminates hypothetical bias in valuation responses for
a variety of public goods. List (2001) tests a similar script for private goods using sportscard
auctions and finds that cheap talk is effective in eliminating hypothetical bias for non-dealers,
but not for dealers. The cheap-talk scripts used in both of these studies are almost identical in
*We thank John Tamei, Kent Miller, and other employees of the Washington State University's Survey
Research Laboratory for conducting the survey for this study. We also thank Robert Berrens and John Loomis for
insightful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. This research is supported by National Science Foundation
grant #0108159.
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length and content. They each provide lengthy descriptions of positive hypothetical bias (i.e.,
upward bias in the valuation responses of those facing hypothetical rather than actual payment).
In order for cheap talk (such as that applied by CT and List) to be a useful design element in
CVM surveys, the script needs to be general so that, unlike ex post calibration, it can be easily
applied across a wide array of non-market goods without requiring ex ante information on the
degree of hypothetical bias. Unfortunately, the scripts used in CT and List (2001) are not easily
generalized. 1 Both scripts refer to a baseline degree of hypothetical bias by comparing the
outcomes of preliminary experiments with hypothetical and real payment mechanisms for the
goods in question. In CVM research, such prior information regarding the degree of hypothetical
bias is typically unavailable or too expensive to produce in the field.
Our research addresses this concern by testing a version of cheap talk that can easily be
generalized to other goods or services. We administered a telephone survey to over 4,000
households regarding their WTP for a curbside recycling service. Unlike the pure public goods
used in the CT experiments and the private good in List's field auctions, curbside recycling can
be considered an impure public good because it provides both potential private benefits (in the
forms of added convenience relative to dropoff recycling, reduced garbage fees, and a "warm
glow" from helping the environment), and public benefits by reducing the stream of waste going
to landfills (Andreoni, 1990). As part of our survey design, we randomly assigned our sample
into three groups - the first receiving no cheap talk, the second receiving a short-script version of
cheap talk, and the third receiving cheap talk with a reminder of budget constraints and
substitutes. Aside from using a shorter script (to be compatible with phone surveys), the primary
difference between our cheap-talk scripts and those used by CT and List is the manner in which
hypothetical bias is described to the survey respondents. While CT and List state that
hypothetical bias leads people to overstate their true WTP, the cheap-talk scripts in our survey
are purposefully neutral. Instead, they inform respondents that hypothetical bias leads people to

misstate their true WTP.
We crafted neutral cheap-talk stat~ments for two reasons. First, we wished to avoid
criticisms that we are simply layering on another type of bias, one that is independent of the
lIn addition to their main script, CT report similar results using a modified script that replaces the specific
percentages of people in previous studies who voted "yes" for hypothetical and real referenda, with a statement
indicating that "on average" more people voted "yes" for hypothetical referenda (see CT, pages 659-660). Although
the modified script is more general in the sense of not reporting the magnitude of hypothetical bias, it still informs
the subjects of positive hypothetical bias.
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observed hypothetical bias itself? Second, researchers typically do not know ex ante whether
hypothetical bias will exist or ifit will be positive or negative (Carson et aI., 1996). Unlike CT
and List, we had no prior evidence regarding the direction and magnitude of hypothetical bias for
our population. Therefore, we decided to err on the side of caution so as not to induce any
additional bias. Much to our surprise, this seemingly innocuous change in verbiage from a
directed to a neutral script caused respondents receiving cheap talk to state higher WTP than
those not receiving cheap talk. This counterintuitive result is robust across models, types of
households, and types of recycling programs. As a result, we are led to question the efficacy of
cheap-talk statements in mitigating hypothetical bias in CVM surveys.
The next section provides examples of the cheap-talk designs used in the previous studies. In
Section 3, we briefly describe the survey and cheap-talk scripts used in our study. Section 4
reports our empirical evidence on hypothetical bias and cheap talk. Section 5 summarizes our
overall findings.

2. Previous Use of Cheap Talk
CT are the first to use the game-theoretic terminology "cheap talk" in the context of CVM.
Cheap talk differs from standard reminder statements about substitutes and budget constraints in
that the script explicitly warns respondents about the potential problem of hypothetical bias.
Loomis et aI. (1994) and Neil (1995) find that short-scripted reminder statements (without cheap
talk) are ineffective in altering respondents' stated WTP for a public good in a hypothetical
setting. However, CT find that a cheap-talk script openly discussing the existence of positive
hypothetical bias prior to voting on public good referenda eliminates the bias in an experimental
setting, in the sense that the results from the cheap-talk and actual referenda are statistically
indistinguishable. 3 An excerpt from CT's cheap-talk script is given below

... in a recent study, several different groups of people voted on a referendum just
like the one you are about to vote on. Payment was hypothetical for these groups, as it
will be for you. No one had to pay money if the referendum passed. The results of
these studies were that on average 38 percent of them voted 'yes". With another set of
2This hypothesis of a "layering effect" is refuted by CT for one of their sub-groups. However, we feel that
it is still an open question, particularly for CVM surveys.
3 In a more recent public-good experiment, Murphy et al. (2003) fmd that the CT cheap-talk script reduces
hypothetical bias but does not completely eliminate it.
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groups with similar people voting on the same referendum as you will vote on here, but
where payment was real and people really did have to pay money if the referendum
passed, the results on average across the groups were that 25 percent voted yes. That's
quite a difference, isn't it?
We call this a "hypothetical bias." Hypothetical bias is the difference that we
continually see in the way people respond to hypothetical referenda as compared to
real referenda ...
List reads a nearly identical cheap-talk script to market participants in a field auction for
sportscards. Similar to CT, he finds that cheap-talk statements are effective in eliminating
hypothetical bias, but only for ordinary consumers (non-dealers). Dealers, who presumably have
more market experience in valuing sportscards, are not influenced by cheap talk.
Poe et al. (2002) find that the following short script
I have one caution though. For programs like this it's often the case that more
people say they would sign up than actually do sign-up. Utilities in other parts of the
country have found that eight times as many people say yes to similar programs as
actually take part in them. With this in mind ...
does not have a statistically significant effect on the participation decisions of individuals
valuing green power and tree planting in New York via a provision-point mechanism CVM
survey. Aadland and Caplan (2003) also employ a shorter version of cheap talk than CT and
List. Similar to List, they find that the effectiveness of cheap talk varies by type of household.
In particular, those households who might be expected to suffer the most from positive

hypothetical bias (e.g. those motivated by ethical duty or membership in an environmental
organization) also tend to lower their stated WTP the most in response to cheap talk. Their
cheap-talk script reads

... studies have shown that many people say they are willing to pay more for
curbside recycling than they actually will pay when it becomes available in their
community. For this reason, as I read the next two curbside recycling fees, please
imagine your household actually paying them.
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that short-script cheap-talk statements can be
effective in mitigating positive hypothetical bias in CVM surveys.4
4In a related working paper, Cummings et al. (1995) fmd that while "heavy" cheap talk tends to offset
positive hypothetical bias, "light" cheap talk actually tends to increase the upward bias in a public good valuation
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3. Cheap-Talk and Survey Design
During the winter of 2002, we conducted a telephone survey about recycling behavior to over
4,000 households in 40 western U.S. cities. 5 Our primary goal was to estimate household WTP
for curbside recycling, controlling for a host ofhousehold-, program-, and community-specific
characteristics. We described the following hypothetical curbside recycling program (CRP) to
households who either did not have a CRP in their community or were unaware of its existence:
At the beginning of the survey, you said that your community does not currently
have a curbside recycling service. For the next few questions, please imagine that you
COULD have a service that regularly collects aluminum cans, cardboard, glass, paper,
plastic and tin cans. Your household (would/would not) need to sort your recyclables
into separate bins and pay a fee for the recycling service, in addition to your current
monthly garbage collection fee. Now we are going to ask you some questions about
your household's willingness to pay for this type of curbside recycling service.
After describing the CRP, we then randomly assigned respondents with equal probability to
one of three groups. The first group received no cheap-talk statement and proceeded directly to
the valuation questions. The second group received the following short-scripted cheap talk
statement, which was read prior to the ensuing double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC)
WTP questions:
As you prepare to answer the next few questions, please keep in mind that in
previous surveys we have found that the amounts that people SAY they are willing to
pay for curbside recycling are sometimes different from the amounts that they would
ACTUALLY be willing to pay when curbside recycling became available in their
community. For this reason, as I read the following curbside recycling fees, please
imagine your household is ACTUALLY paying them.
This cheap-talk script is substantially shorter than that used by CT and List (2001) - so as to be
compatible with a phone survey - and intentionally does not take a stand regarding the direction
of hypothetical bias. The third group of households received the following "long" cheap-talk
script, which added explicit reminders to the household about budget constraints and alternatives
to recycling:

experiment. We note, however, that their light version is still a much longer script than those used by Poe et al.
(2002) and Aadland and Caplan (2003) .
5The survey was administered by the survey research laboratory at Washington State University.
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As you prepare to answer the next few questions, please keep in mind the following
three things. First, keep in mind your household budget. In a typical month, at what
price would your household be able to afford curbside recycling? Second, keep in mind
that there are alternatives to curbside recycling such as recycling drop-off centers and
landfills. And third, keep in mind that in previous surveys we have found that the
amounts that people SAY they are willing to pay for curbside recycling are sometimes
differentfrom the amounts that they would ACTUALLY be willing to pay when curbside
recycling became available in their community. For this reason, as I read the following
curbside recyclingfees, please imagine your household is ACTUALLYpaying them.
Our decision to test variations in script length and reminders about budget constraints and
substitutes is motivated by mixed results in the literature. As mentioned above, CT find that
long-scripted cheap talk is effective in an experimental setting. List (2001) finds that similar
long-scripted cheap talk is effective in field auctions for dealers but ineffective for non-dealers.
Similar to List, Aadland and Caplan (2003) find a short-scripted version of cheap talk is effective
only for certain types of households. Poe et al. (2002) report that short-scripted cheap talk is
ineffective in eliminating hypothetical bias. Loomis et al. (1994) and Neil (1995) find that
reminders about budget constraints and substitutes are also ineffective. In sum, the evidence
regarding the effectiveness of various cheap-talk and reminder statements is anything but clear.
Our survey was designed to help sort out the patterns between cheap talk, reminder statements,
and hypothetical bias.

4. Empirical Results
In this section, we report three sets of empirical results. The first set documents the existence

of positive hypothetical bias in our data. That is, we find that households who are making a
hypothetical decision to participate in a CRP are, all else equal, more likely to participate than
households who have made an actual decision of whether to participate in a real CRP. Next, we
document the unconditional and conditional effects of cheap-talk scripts on households'
responses. For our unconditional evidence, we contrast stated participation rates for the CRP
referendum with and without cheap talk. The advantage of examining the unconditional
participation rates is that they are transparent and are not dependent on any particular
econometric model. For our conditional evidence, we report the coefficient estimates associated
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with cheap-talk dummy variables from an econometric model where we control for a host of
potential differences across treatments and groups.

4.1 Estimates of Hypothetical Bias
We begin by documenting the existence of positive hypothetical bias in our CVM responses.
Toward this end, we compare the participation decisions of households who are voting on a
hypothetical CRP referendum with the actual participation decisions of households in
communities with existing voluntary CRPs. 6 Our survey was designed to facilitate such a
comparison by choosing appropriate bid values and describing hypothetical CRPs that are similar
to existing voluntary programs in our sample.
Our discussion of the econometric model used to document the existence of positive
hypothetical bias is purposefully brief, as it closely follows the procedure outlined in Cameron
(1988) and Aadland and Caplan (2003). WTP questions are set in the DBDC format to elicit a
household's WTP through a sequence of yes-or-no valuation questions. The fIrst question is:
"Would you be willing to pay $7 for the service?" The opening bid 7 is chosen randomly from
the integers $2 through $10 in order to mitigate the effects of starting point bias. Based on her
response to the opening bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up question, but with a
larger bid, 7H = 27, if she answered "yes" (i.e., willing to pay at least 7 for the service) or a
smaller bid 7L = 0.57 if she answered "no" (i.e., unwilling to pay 7 for the service). Those who
answer "no" to the fIrst two questions are then asked whether they would participate in a
program that is free of charge. Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up
questions, the respondent's latent WTP may be placed in one of fIve regions: (-00,0), (0,7d,

(7L,7), (7, 7H) or (7H' 00).
We then posit that the household's true WTP (WTP*) is represented by the equation

(1)

where Xj is a row vector ofhousehold-, program-, and community-specifIc control variables,
a corresponding column vector of coeffIcients, and Ej is a normally distributed error term for

6By

"voluntary" we mean that the household pays for the program only if it has signed up for it.

~

is
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households i = 1, ... ,no We also allow for possible heteroscedasticity by modeling the variance of
the WTP error term as

(2)

where Zj is a row vector of variables related to the disturbance variances and y is a column vector
of parameters.
To detect hypothetical bias we pool respondents who have made actual participation
decisions in communities with voluntary CRPs with respondents who have valued similar
hypothetical CRPs at similar bid values. 7 We then estimate a simple (random-threshold) pro bit
model for the decision of whether to participate in a CRP, while controlling for a host of
demographic, program, and community attributes such as age, education, income, employment
status, motivation for recycling, degree of sorting required for CRP, availability and use of
substitutes to recycling, etc. 8 Our null hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing
the statistical significance of the coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation
decision is hypothetical (i.e., based on the household's valuation of the hypothetical program) or
real (i.e., based on the household's actual decision of whether to participate in its community's
existing CRP). Ifwe find that there is no statistical difference between the participation rates of
households in communities with voluntary CRPs and those hypothetically valuing a CRP then,
all else equal, we conclude that hypothetical bias is unlikely to be a problem in our population.
If instead, the coefficient on the hypothetical dummy variable is positive and statistically
significant, we conclude that positive hypothetical bias is likely to exist, and its average level is
measured by the value of the coefficient. The estimation results are shown in Table 1.

7 Specifically, our pooled dataset is created by first including all households that know a voluntary CRP
exists in their community (and therefore have revealed their preferences via the decision of whether to participate).
These CRPs vary in terms of their monthly cost-of-living-adjusted fees (which are roughly between $1 and $5 per
month), and whether they require sorting of the recyclables. Cost-of-living indices for the cities in our sample were
derived from the city comparison calculator at http://list.realestate.yahoo.com/re/neighbor/ and used to adjust CRP
fees and income levels. Second, we include all households that valued hypothetical sorting and non-sorting CRPs
with opening bids that were within the $1 to $5 interval for existing voluntary CRPs. Although our WTP questions
are set in the DBDC format, we consider only opening bids so that the design of the hypothetical decision mimics
the actual decision as closely as possible. Finally, the overall sample size is 1,782 with 994 revealed-preference and
788 stated-preference households.
8Detailed definitions of all the variables used in this analysis are included in the Appendix.
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

The signs and significance levels of the demographic, program- and community-specific
variables are similar to the results in Aadland and Caplan (2003). We therefore focus on the
result germane to this section - the sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the
dummy variable for whether the participation decision was hypothetical (HYPOTHETICAL).
The coefficient is statistically significant and indicates that, all else equal, respondents valuing a
hypothetical CRP stated a maximum WTP that is, on average, $3.39 more than those valuing an
existing voluntary CRP. Stated in terms of likelihood of participation, the respondents for the
hypothetical CRP are 17.7 percent more likely to participate than those valuing an existing CRP.
This suggests that positive hypothetical bias is present in our data. Additional evidence of
positive hypothetical bias can also be inferred from the unconditional participation rates
presented in Table 2 of the next section, to which we now tum.
4.2 Unconditional Cheap-Talk Effects
Does cheap talk mitigate the positive hypothetical bias in our data? In Table 2 we report
average rates of participation across bid levels, cheap-talk scripts, and types of CRP (actual or
hypothetical). It is important to note that unlike the analysis in the previous section, we are not
interested in the actual participation decisions of households residing in communities with
voluntary CRPs. Instead, we focus on how cheap talk influences the stated maximum WTP of
households that are either placing a value on the existing CRP in their community or the
hypothetical CRP.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

Before discussing the effects of cheap talk, notice that, as expected, participation rates
generally decline as the bid levels increase. Also, notice that for the cases where no cheap talk is
given (i.e., No C-Talk columns), the participation rates are higher (51.0 versus 43.9 percent)
when respondents are valuing a hypothetical, as opposed to an actual, CRP. Although this is not
a pure test of hypothetical bias as in Section 4.1, it lends further credibility to the existence of
positive hypothetical bias in our data.

10

Based on the unconditional participation rates in Table 2, there is strong evidence that our
neutral cheap-talk statements are associated with higher rates of participation and WTP for
curbside recycling. The positive effect of cheap talk appears to be strongest for households who
are valuing an existing CRP in their community (as opposed to the hypothetical CRP described
in our survey), and who received the longer script with cheap talk and a reminder about
substitutes and budget constraints (55.5 versus 43.9 percent). For the case of households valuing
the hypothetical CRP, there is no statistical difference between the participation rates of those
who received the short cheap-talk script and those who did not receive any cheap talk.
Nevertheless, considering the large overall sample size (N = 4268), it is clear that there is
absolutely no evidence that cheap talk (either with or without a reminder about substitutes and
budget constraints) is effective in mitigating the positive hypothetical bias in our data. To the
contrary, cheap talk appears to exacerbate the bias!
We now offer a few potential explanations for this counterintuitive result. To begin, it could
be argued that by including the word "landfills" in our long-script version we unwittingly created
an environmental "flashpoint", triggering images of overflowing garbage dumps in the minds of
respondents who then reacted by inflating their WTP responses. Those receiving short-scripted
cheap talk or none at all did not hear the word "landfill" and therefore may not have conjured up
the same image. The problem with this hypothesis, however, is that it cannot completely explain
our results, as those valuing an actual CRP and receiving short-scripted cheap talk (without the
landfill reference) also tend to be more likely to participate (52.2 versus 43.9 percent - see
Table 2) and, as we will see in Section 4.3, state conditionally higher values than those not
receiving any cheap talk.
A second possible explanation, provided by Cummings et al. (1995), is that cheap talk
"might assure those doubting the hypothetical nature of the experiment that it is indeed
hypothetical" and as a result encourages positive hypothetical bias. The difficulty with this
explanation is in understanding why additional positive bias is elicited from some scripts but not
others. A third possibility is that when they hear a neutral cheap-talk script stating only that
"people tend to misstate their true WTP," as opposed to the standard script stating that "people
tend to overstate their true WTP," survey respondents may be induced to rely more heavily on
their own heuristics and inferences in an attempt to guess what type of bias the researchers have
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in mind. If this hypothesis is true, our results indicate that respondents may be guessing that we
would expect them to correct this bias by stating higher WTP values.
Each of these hypotheses and our empirical results suggest that we simply do not understand
how the human cognitive process receives and then reacts to signals such as cheap talk. Several
theories of how human cognition reacts to signals are discussed in Fischhoff (2002). As
Fischhoffpoints out, artifacts (such as unexpected responses to cheap talk) could emanate from
"the subtle ways that interviewers communicate their expectations." He also notes that
" ... elicitation is a reactive measurement procedure ... The process assumes that people sometimes
need help, in order to understand what they believe and want. That help may include presenting
a balanced selection of opinions, lest clients miss a critical perspective just because it did not
occur to them at the time." It is possible that in erring on the side of conciseness, our short but
balanced cheap-talk script provided insufficient detail regarding "selection of opinions,"
resulting in unpredictable effects on WTP.
As a final note, we acknowledge that our counterintuitive cheap-talk results could simply be
due to systematic differences in the treatment and control groups. This seems unlikely, however,
as the cheap-talk scripts were assigned randomly across such a large number of households and
communities. Nevertheless, for the sake of thoroughness, we now turn to a conditional analysis
of cheap talk's effects.
4.3 Conditional Cheap-Talk Effects
Our conditional estimates are based on the DBDC model first introduced by Carson et al.
(1986) and applied in Aadland and Caplan (2003). We use maximum likelihood to estimate the
full model that incorporates the responses to both the initial and follow-up bids. As in the
participation probit model in Section 4.1, we control for a number of demographic and
community attributes. 9 Based on our earlier work and List (2001), we also estimate models that
allow for differential cheap-talk effects across household characteristics.
The results from this exercise are reported in Table 3. The first row of the Table 3 shows the
effect of short and long cheap talk across all households that are valuing either a hypothetical or
an actual CRP. The remaining rows report the results of the two cheap-talk scripts interacted

9The estimated coefficients on these control variables are similar in sign and significance to the results in
Table 1, and therefore are omitted.
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with certain demographic groups. Consistent with the unconditional cheap-talk results in the
previous section, all of the coefficients are either positive or not statistically different than zero.
Overall, survey respondents are more sensitive to cheap talk when they are valuing an actual
CRP and when cheap talk is accompanied by a reminder about substitutes and budget
constraints.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

Furthermore, households with at least one member holding a Ph.D. or equivalent professional
degree and who received short (long)-scripted cheap talk, are all else equal, willing to pay
approximately $1.23 (1.49) more per month for curbside recycling than their counterparts who
did not receive short (long)-scripted. Respondents who belong to an environmental organization
and who received the short script are willing to pay an additional $2.05 per month, on average,
while those who received the long script are only willing to pay an additional $1.81 per month.
In sum, our results indicate that cheap-talk statements may be ineffective or even counterproductive in mitigating hypothetical bias, with the degree of the problem varying across types
of households.

5. Conclusion
The evidence from our CVM survey draws into question the efficacy of cheap talk as a
reliable and robust ex ante correction mechanism for positive hypothetical bias. Although initial
research has shown that a long-scripted version of cheap talk can be effective in eliminating this
bias in lab experiments and field auctions, shorter and more neutrally worded scripts tailored for
phone interviews have clearly demonstrated a sensitivity to script length and content. Indeed, we
first establish the existence of positive hypothetical bias by contrasting revealed and stated
preference information, but then find that our neutral cheap-talk scripts actually exacerbate the
problem. Moreover, the degree of exacerbation seems to increase with script length and with
respect to household characteristics (e.g., education, environmental advocacy, etc.) that are likely
to be systematically related to the degree of observed hypothetical bias.
A potential criticism of our cheap-talk design is that we did not a priori establish a baseline
degree of hypothetical bias in our data. Had we known the extent of positive hypothetical bias in
our data beforehand, we could have chosen a script informing respondents of the direction and
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(possibly the magnitude) of the bias, rather than using a neutral script. CT, List, and Aadland
and Caplan (2003) report some success with these types of directed scripts. However, the
primary attraction of cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical bias is its apparent
generalizability - in the form of a standard script - to CVM studies across a wide array of nonmarket goods and services. Our findings suggest that standardized cheap-talk scripts can
produce undesirable results. As a result, we feel caution is warranted in using cheap talk to
correct for hypothetical bias until we better understand how the length and content of cheap talk
statements influence the cognitive processes of survey respondents.
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Appendix
Explanatory Variables

Description

Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment?
1 = yes, 0 = no.
Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money? For example, are
Monetary
you able to use a smaller garbage container because you recycle or you
get money for your aluminum cans? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Which one would most encourage your household to recycle: an ethical
Primarily Ethics
duty to help the environment, or saving money?
1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money.
Dropoff Distance
Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site.
In the past 12 months has your household taken any recyclable
Dropoff User
materials to one of your community's drop-off recycling centers?
1 = yes, 0 = no.
Young
1 if 18<Age<35, 0 otherwise.
Old
1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise.
Male
1 = male, 0 = female.
What is the highest level of education attained by any member of your
High School
household? 1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise
Associates
1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise
Bachelors
1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise
Masters
1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise
Ph.D.
1 = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise
Number of adults currently living in the household who are older than
Household Size
18 years of age, other than the respondent.
Environmental
Does anyone in your household belong to an environmental club,
Organization
group, or organization? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Med Income
1 if$35K1yr<Household Income<$75K1yr, 0 otherwise
High Income
1 if$75K1yr<Household Income, 0 otherwise
Is the adult with the highest income currently working for pay, either
Employed
full time or part time? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Retired
Is the adult with the highest income currently retired? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Short Cheap Talk
1 = received short cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise.
Longer Cheap Talk
1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise.
Sorting Required
1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise.
Polite
1 if polite refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise.
Angry
1 if angry refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise.
Certainty
On a scale from 1 to 100, how certain are you to the last WTP question?
Has anyone in your household ever visited your community's landfill?
Landfill Visit
1 = yes, 0 = no.
Landfill Distance
Distance to nearest landfill in miles.
Landfill Distance> 2 mi. Distance to nearest landfill in miles if greater than 2 miles, 0 otherwise.
Hypothetical
1 = respondent valued a hypothetical CRP, 0 = otherwise.
Ethical Duty
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Table 1. Random-Threshold Probit Model For CRP Participation (N = 1782)
Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient

P -Value

Ethical Duty
Monetary

5.380***
-3.051 ***

0.000
0.000

Primarily Ethics

1.848***

0.005

Dropoff Distance

0.106

0.145

Dropoff User
Young

-0.785
1.136**

0.112
0.018

Old

-1.769**

0.029

Male
High School

-0.249

0.281

1.401

0.160

Some College

1.259

0.182

Associates

1.944*

0.096

Bachelors

2.383**

0.047

Masters

2.927**

0.028

Ph.D.

2.824**

0.040

Household Size

0.066
2.125***

0.387

Environmental Organization
MedIncome

-0.077

0.007
0.450

High Income

0.226

0.368

Employed

1.147

0.111

1.872*

0.058

Short Cheap Talk
Longer Cheap Talk

Retired

0.828
2.336***

0.144

Sorting Required
Polite

-1.886***

0.003

-1.661 ***

0.006

Angry

1.683

0.008
0.252

Landfill Visit

0.315

0.265
0.084

Landfill Distance

-10.098*

Landfill Distance> 2 mi.

9.923*

0.087

Certainty

-0.002

0.412

Hypothetical

3.385***

0.000

Heteroscedasticity Variables

Coefficient

P -Value

Constant

3.392***

0.000

Bid

0.101

0.162

Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
respectively.
The dependent variable is participation in a CRP. The estimates for the
constant term, as well as binary variables for "don't know" and missing responses are not
shown.
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Table 2. Unconditional Participation Rates Across Cheap-Talk Scripts (N = 4268)
Hypothetical CRP
No
Short
C-Talk C-Talk

Opening
Bids
($/month)

Totals

Actual CRP

Long
C-Talk

N

Short
No
C-Talk C-Talk

Long
C-Talk

N

2

69.4

68.1

70.6

247

64.2

78.0**

75.0*

239

3

50.7

69.0**

79.7***

221

65.0

67.3

73.3

248

4

56.6

59.8

73.5**

226

51.2

61.4*

68.2***

272

5

67.1

62.1

64.0

236

52.7

70.9***

62.7*

286

6

47.9

56.5

62.5**

198

39.3

42.0

56.1 **

270

7

47.5

31.5**

42.5

207

40.8

46.3

43.0

244

8

38.7

44.7

42.9

194

33.7

39.1

41.7

266

9

36.4

35.2

39.3

198

22.5

24.7

34.8**

236

10

45.0

34.0

40.0

183

25.3

39.7**

44.4***

297

51.0

51.2

57.2**

1910

43.9

52.2*** 55.5*** 2358

Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significantly different than No C-Talk at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance
levels respectively. Estimated variances for the differences in proportions are calculated as described in
Freund (1992, p. 414-6). CRP == Curbside Recycling Program. C-Talk == Cheap Talk.
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Table 3. Conditional Estimates of Cheap-Talk Scripts on Maximum WTP (N = 4253)
Cheap-Talk Coefficients
Interactive
Actual CRP
Hypothetical CRP
Terms
Long C-Talk
Short C-Talk
Long C-Talk
Short C-Talk
None

0.137
(0.272)

0.561 **
(0.273)

0.674***
(0.255)

0.997***
(0.249)

Young

0.319
(0.462)

0.618*
(0.459)

0.753*
(0.481)

1.202***
(0.461)

Female

-0.351
(0.362)

0.275
(0.354)

0.321
(0.319)

0.836***
(0.312)

Env.Org.

0.544
(0.992)

0.837
(1.019)

2.054***
(0.840)

1.805**
(0.849)

Bachelors

0.092
(0.485)

0.719*
(0.507)

1.185***
(0.452)

1.098***
(0.453)

Ph.D.

0.146
(1.005)

0.424
(1.015)

1.228*
(0.913)

1.491 **
(0.870)

Sort

0.247
(0.386)

0.807**
(0.389)

0.368
(0.400)

1.004***
(0.395)

Ethical Duty

0.281
(0.302)

0.573**
(0.298)

0.630***
(0.267)

1.030***
(0.262)

Certainty

0.246
(0.337)

0.711**
(0.342)

0.818***
(0.312)

1.151***
(0.302)

Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significantly different than No C-Talk at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance
levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. CRP == Curbside Recycling Program. WTP ==
Willingness To Pay. C-Talk == Cheap Talk.

